Harden CKTAP certificate validation and add production-root checks - #72
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Require certificate validation to enforce the production Coinkite factory root so a fake TAPSIGNER is reported as counterfeit. Reject malformed or empty certificate data as a validation error.
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Summary
Scope
This hardens rust-cktap certificate validation. It does not make certificate checking automatic. Applications must call the check before setup, import, signing, or other operations that depend on card authenticity.
Cove had a separate integration defect: it created and used a TAPSIGNER without calling the certificate check. That call-site fix belongs in Cove.
Verification
All GitHub Actions build, test, formatting, and Clippy checks pass.