Insomnia is experimental software. There is no security-response SLA. Report suspected vulnerabilities against the current main branch or a release tag, including the affected revision and a minimal, non-destructive reproduction.

Do not publish passwords, Keychain data, personal logs, or weaponized exploit details in a public issue. If GitHub shows a Report a vulnerability action on this repository's Security page, use that private channel. Otherwise open a public issue containing only a request for a private security contact, without the sensitive details, and wait for the maintainer to arrange one.

The installer grants the user account passwordless access to four exact pmset commands listed in the README. This grant is not exclusive to the Insomnia app: other processes running as that user can invoke them too. The app is not sandboxed; local logs can contain SSIDs, process metadata, and tmux target names. The lines the app writes to insomnia.log also reach the unified log with the body marked private, so programs reading log show see <private> instead of those names unless private data logging is enabled on the Mac. The files Insomnia creates (logs, journal, session, config, recovery lock) are mode 0600 and its directories 0700; the backstop runs with umask 077. Insomnia sets only these modes and leaves any access control list (ACL) on these files as it is, so an ACL someone added can still give another account access. Logs are capped at 1 MiB with one older copy kept. A log the user replaced with a symlink is not rotated: the file it points to is the user's to manage. Location Services access is requested only when a hotspot is saved or a session starts with one configured; it is used to read Wi-Fi network names and the app never requests location updates. With the App Nap setting on (off by default), the app writes NSAppSleepDisabled into the preferences of each app on the agent list, after recording the previous value in its journal, and puts it back at session end.

The hotspot password is a generic-password item in the login Keychain (service insomnia-hotspot). Its access list names only the Insomnia build that saved it, so any other program asking for it gets the system Keychain prompt, which you can refuse. Insomnia itself reads the item with prompts switched off: an item it may not read is reported in the menu and in Settings instead of being prompted for or silently ignored. Two limits remain. Ad-hoc signing gives every install a new code identity, so the access list pins one build and the password must be entered again after a reinstall; a stable signing identity (Developer ID) would let the access list name every build signed with it. And the item lives in the file-based login Keychain, which ignores the data-protection accessibility classes (this device only, when unlocked); using that Keychain needs an access-group entitlement, which needs a team id. Releases are ad-hoc signed, so both limits stay.

The recovery LaunchAgent runs only the backstop.sh sealed inside the signed app bundle, after codesign --verify --strict passes against the code requirement pinned in its plist (the build's cdhash for an ad-hoc signature). An edited bundle or script is refused and logged. The app pins the code it is running (its own designated requirement, after confirming that the bundle on disk is still that code and passes the agent's check), so a bundle edited or re-signed under the running app is refused, not re-pinned. The plist itself lives in ~/Library/LaunchAgents and, like every per-user LaunchAgent, can be edited by any program running as that user. With ad-hoc signatures these checks are integrity against accidents and against the app relaying a tampered bundle; they are not a boundary against a process running as the same user, which can edit the plist, load its own agent, replace and relaunch the app, and invoke the four pmset commands directly.

Release zips are built by the Release workflow from the tagged commit and published with a SHA256SUMS file and a GitHub build provenance attestation. Verify both before installing (shasum -a 256 -c SHA256SUMS, gh attestation verify <zip> -R krishhgg/Insomnia --signer-workflow krishhgg/Insomnia/.github/workflows/release.yml --source-ref refs/tags/v<version>); install.sh --app then checks the signature, identifier and version of a private copy of the bundle before asking for a password, installs that copy, and refuses it unless --allow-unverified-origin is given, because it cannot verify where a bundle came from, whatever its signature names. The attestation shows which workflow run produced the bytes, not that the code is free of defects. Releases are ad-hoc signed and not notarized (docs/releasing.md), so macOS blocks their first launch.

Passing automated checks or a secret scan does not establish the absence of vulnerabilities. Do not probe recovery by disrupting someone else's processes, power settings, network, or data.