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Name web admin sign-ins in the audit log - #27
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Migration 0007 gives a device its client kind, platform and app version and, once revoked, the time and the reason, and gives a user the time of the last password change (plus a disabled time nothing reads yet). All of it is additive, BIGINT on Postgres, and the flag stays the check. Meta gets create_device_with and redeem_with, rename_device, revoke_device_as, revoke_other_devices, revoke_all_devices, account, change_password and reset_password. Flag, time and reason are set together and only by the first revoke. A password change or reset sets the hash, revokes the devices and deletes the account's invite and pairings in one transaction. Tests run on both databases, including the migration from 0006. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
New: GET /account, POST /account/password, PATCH /devices/{id} and
POST /devices/revoke-others. Sign-in and join take an optional client
kind, platform and app version, checked before a try is counted. The
device list shows them with the time and reason of a revoke; all new
fields are optional on the wire.
Changing the password answers a wrong current password with 403
wrong_password, never 401, since the agent reads every 401 on a
signed-in route as a revoked device. It is limited to five tries per
account in 15 minutes, takes a password-check slot, and ends the revoked
devices' live connections at once. Password and name bodies are read up
to the new TINY_JSON_BYTES (4 KiB).
wrong_password and forbidden move into the shared error codes; the local
API refers to them. The agent, app and desktop only change where they
build the extended types.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
user reset-password now revokes every device of the account (reason reset) and deletes its open invite and pairings, so a stolen token does not outlive the old password. --keep-devices restores the old behaviour for the devices. device revoke-all signs out an account's devices without touching the password. Both print how many devices they ended; device revoke records the admin as the reason. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The API table and error codes in the design document, the password and sign-out commands, the live-connection delay of the command line and the rollout note (an older server refuses the newer database) in the server guide. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…evice A /changes long-poll that was waiting when its device was signed out through the API now ends at once, and one that wakes for any other reason looks the device up again before it answers, so a device signed out by the command line gets 401 instead of the next change set. The live endpoint listens for revocations and looks the device up before the upgrade, so a revoke between the sign-in check and the subscription is not missed. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
change_password checks, inside its transaction, that the calling device is still signed in (it may have been revoked while the password was hashed) and answers 401 if not. A password that changed meanwhile is now 409 conflict instead of 400 invalid. Both are new MetaError variants mapped in the server. set_password_hash had no caller outside a test and is removed. A new test breaks the pairing deletes with a trigger and checks that a password change, an admin reset and a revoke-others undo everything on SQLite and Postgres. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The long-poll now listens for revocations and looks its device up before it waits, so a revoke between the sign-in check and the wait is not missed, and looks it up once more after the change set is fetched, as the last step before the answer, so a revoke during the fetch is not answered with changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…changes a password change_password locked the caller's device row and then the user's row, while revoke_other_devices from another device locked its own device and then the user's, and reset_password locked the user before the devices. On Postgres two of them at once could deadlock and fail with a database error. All of them now take the user's row first (a no-op update), then the devices, then the pairings. A new scenario runs password changes, sign-outs and an admin reset at the same moment, over and over, on both databases and expects only successes, conflicts and signed-out callers. The test trigger helper also drops its Postgres function. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…-in adds a device redeem consumed the invite and then updated the user, while a password reset locks the user and then deletes the invite, so the two could deadlock on Postgres. redeem now finds the invite or pairing with a plain read, locks the account, and consumes the code again under the lock; a code that is gone by then is invalid_code. create_pairing locks the account first too. A password sign-in verified the password outside any transaction, so a reset or change that committed meanwhile could be followed by a new device. sign_in_device locks the account and compares the stored hash again before it creates the device; if it differs, login answers as for a wrong password. New scenarios run redeems, a sign-in, a pairing and a reset at the same moment on both databases and expect no database error and no live device once the reset is done. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The invite delete and the pairing update now name the account the plain read found, so a code hash removed and made again for another account between that read and the lock is refused as invalid_code instead of adding a device to the wrong account. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The admin API's server overview shows whether blobs are on disk, in S3 or in memory. A backend that does not say is reported as other, so nothing outside the store crate has to change. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
New request and answer types for the routes under /api/v1/admin, with a redacting Debug for everything that holds a password or a code, and the error codes account_disabled and last_admin. The confirmation is a body with an optional password today, so an optional totp_code can join it later without breaking a client. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migration 0008 adds the purpose of an invite (invite or reset), a quota per space and a removal mark per user. The new Meta methods for the admin API each re-check the acting admin inside their own transaction and take the locks in one order, with a transaction-wide lock before the last-admin count. Disabled accounts are refused by the token check, sign-in, redeem, pairing and device creation, decided under the account's row lock. A reset code always sets a new password, signs every device out and then signs the redeeming computer in. A space's quota replaces the server-wide cap in the preflight check and in the count that follows. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The require_admin layer and the routes under /api/v1/admin: counters, a paged and searchable user list, creating accounts, changing role and quota, disabling, enabling and removing, invites, password reset codes and a user's devices. Every change asks for the acting admin's password in its body. Sign-in and join answer account_disabled for a disabled account, and a redeemed reset code ends the live connections of the devices it signed out. Documents the API, the confirmation and the rollout in the design document and the server guide. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Limiter::count added the attempt before comparing it with the maximum, so tries refused at the limit still raised the count. A refund of an attempt that had been accepted at the same moment then left the key above its limit with fewer wrong passwords than allowed. A refused try now leaves the count alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Disabling and enabling an account leaves the password hash as it was, so a sign-in that verified the password before the disable could still create a usable device after the enable. Users get an auth_gen counter (migration 0008) that a disable, an enable, a removal and every password change or reset bump. The sign-in reads it with the hash and sign_in_device compares both under the account's lock. The server's refunds test covers the limiter change. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The typed details of a security event, an event, a page of them and the last line of the NDJSON export. Every field of the details is a closed list of words or a number, and fields a later release adds are ignored. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migration 0009 adds audit_events, with no foreign keys so that an event outlives its account. Every change that the log names writes its event in its own transaction before the commit, so a change whose event cannot be written is not made. A change that changes nothing writes none. A failed sign-in is one row per account and minute whose counter goes up, written in a transaction of its own. The values of an event are typed and come from closed lists, never from what a client typed. Old events are pruned in batches outside those transactions. Meta methods that had no way to say who asked get one: revoke_device_by takes the origin, and admin_enable_user and admin_revoke_invite take the time. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /account/activity, GET /admin/audit and the streamed GET /admin/audit/export; a failed sign-in is written after the answer is decided and never changes it. [audit] retention_days (1 to 3650, default 365) and audit list and audit prune on the command line. The export reads fixed pages through a bounded channel up to a fixed end of the log and ends with a line that says complete or truncated, or breaks the connection. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The routes and events in the design, and the retention, the personal data and the upgrade note in the server guide. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…in the export, reword the append-only note The account's own activity no longer shows the details (the device an admin signed out, roles, counts) of an event about another account, which a former administrator would otherwise keep seeing. The export validates before_ms like the list and applies it to every page and the probe besides its fixed end. The docs now say the append-only choice is a design decision, not that SQLite has no triggers. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
aes-gcm 0.10.3 (MIT OR Apache-2.0, pure Rust) seals the stored TOTP secrets. hmac 0.13, sha1 0.11, subtle 2.6 and zeroize 1.9 were in the lockfile already as transitive packages and become direct dependencies of the server: HMAC-SHA-1 makes the codes authenticator apps speak, subtle compares them in constant time, zeroize wipes secrets. The server's tests also turn on its own test-support feature, to move its clock. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migration 0009 adds the secret and recovery-code tables, the sign-in challenges and the invites' reset_two_factor flag. Everything that issues a device or uses a proof up locks the account's row first and checks again, under the lock, the device, the password hash, auth_gen, the account's current two-factor state and the challenge. A time step is accepted once and only a later one after it, a recovery code once, and a wrong proof is counted in a transaction of its own after the refused one rolled back, so the counters survive; ten in a row lock the second factor for 15 minutes, doubling up to 24 hours. Turning it on, off or resetting it ends what an earlier check let through (auth_gen, challenges, invite, pairings, devices). Redeeming an invite or reset code of an account that has it takes the second factor in the same transaction; the admin's reset of another account's two-factor sign-in, the reset_two_factor flag of reset codes and the admin's own two-factor state are part of the admin changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Routes under /account/two-factor (status, setup, confirm, disable, recovery
codes), POST /auth/login/second-factor, a second factor on /join, a code on the
admin API's confirmations (one time step serves one change), POST
/admin/users/{id}/reset-two-factor and reset_two_factor on password-reset codes.
Resetting another admin's password or two-factor sign-in takes the acting
admin's own.
The secret is sealed with AES-256-GCM bound to the account (secretbox.rs) under
the key from [two_factor] key_file, which init makes and serve never does; serve
opens every stored secret at start and refuses to run when the key is missing or
one does not open. Rotation is key_file_old plus two-factor rekey. user
reset-2fa takes it away on the command line. TOTP (RFC 6238) is in totp.rs with
the RFC vectors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ation Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e secrets fresh per account A wrong proof was counted after its transaction rolled back and released the account's lock, so requests that waited for it checked a stale challenge and a stale lock: more than five checks per challenge, and parallel failures could jump the first lock from 15 to 30 minutes. Every check now runs before anything is consumed (join checks the second factor before it deletes the invite), so the refusing transaction commits the counters itself, still under the lock. two_factor_rewrite reads an account's active and set-up ciphertexts fresh under its lock and rewrites both; two_factor_all_secrets lists everything for the final scan of rekey. join_code_locked_for lets the join route report a lock. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ock win at join rekey no longer works from a snapshot: a confirmation that moves a set-up's secret to the active one between the scan and the update was left under the old key while the command said the old key could go. It now rewrites both ciphertexts of an account under its lock, scans again, and fails unless nothing is under another key. The join route reports an active two-factor lock (429 two_factor_locked with Retry-After) instead of the limiter's answer when the code belongs to such an account. The key's name no longer claims to be unique. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e key's name is Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ce in its test When a join limiter refuses, the answer is now the same for every code (429 rate_limited with Retry-After from the limiter's window), so it no longer tells a guesser whether a code is real or its account locked; the lock is told only to a request the limiters let through. The rekey test now holds rekey between its scan and its rewrite (rekey_hooked) until the confirmations have committed, and checks the first successful rekey instead of repairing with a second run. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…lenge and the app client's methods The local API gets the second step of a sign-in (/v1/login/second-factor), the account's two-factor calls passed on to the server, the password change, other computers and device rename, and a second factor on /v1/join. A refusal's challenge and wait (ErrorExtras) reach the app as Error::RefusedWith, so code that matches Error::Refused keeps working. The wire types the app needs move from proto to api, which proto re-exports. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…unt's two-factor calls The agent keeps the server's refusals whole in a type of its own (CallError), so a wrong code, a wrong password or a lock is never read as a revoked device while a real 401 still is; sync's TransportError is unchanged. login and join prompt for the code on standard input (three tries, a lock says how long to wait), the local API passes the challenge and the wait on typed, and every new route has its own small body limit. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The signed-in view gets a Security button. The page shows the account's two-factor status, sets it up (password, then the secret with a QR code and the first code), shows the recovery codes once, turns it off, makes new codes, changes the password and signs the other computers out. A join for an account with two-factor sign-in asks for the code (or a recovery code) and sends the same join again with it. Secrets live in the page's step only, are dropped when it is left, and are redacted in Debug. The signed-in snapshots change by the new button. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…etry-After header The password and code fields of the Security page and of the join's second step get stable ids, and every frame the egui state of each such field is dropped unless the model holds text typed in it, so once a secret was sent, a step cancelled or the page left, Undo can't bring it back. A kittest test types, sends, cancels and leaves, reopens and presses Ctrl+Z. The local client keeps an answer's Retry-After header and uses it for the wait of a refusal when the JSON has no retry_after_secs. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Turning two-factor sign-in on and off, new recovery codes, a recovery code's use, an admin's and the command line's reset, and auth.login on both successful sign-in paths are written in the transaction of the change, so an error in the log fails the change. The wrong second step of a sign-in or a join is aggregated and written after the answer is decided, and the lock's event after the counters and the lock are committed, so a fault in the log neither undoes the lock nor changes an answer. A reset code that removes two-factor sign-in says so (two_factor_removed) on join.reset_redeemed, by the account that redeemed it. Wrong proofs on signed-in routes are not written one by one. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ctor events over HTTP Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migration 0011 adds web_sessions, which keeps only the BLAKE3 hash of a session token. A session is made by a password sign-in of an administrator (with a second-factor challenge of its own kind when the account has one), is valid while the account's auth_gen is the one it was made under, and ends by idle time, absolute lifetime or logout. Expired rows are pruned in bounded batches. AdminActor now says whether a device or a browser session acts, and the admin changes check under the account's lock that the session is still valid at the time of the change (not logged out, same auth_gen, inside its idle and absolute lifetimes). AdminUser carries removed_ms. Tests run on SQLite and Postgres.
Adds the opt-in admin pages under /web (config section web_admin, off by default; it needs behind_proxy and an https public_url without a path): sign-in with the JSON sign-in's password checks and limits (limiters of their own) and the server's two-factor challenge and lock, the __Host- session cookie (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict), CSRF tokens derived from the session, an Origin check on every post, a strict CSP and the other security headers on every answer (the /web/ redirect too), logout, and pages for the overview, users (search, create, role and quota, disable, enable, remove, invites and reset codes shown once, reset of two-factor sign-in, devices) and the audit log with its NDJSON download. Each change is handed to the same store call as the JSON admin route with the same confirmation. The JSON admin routes and the pages refuse a request with both a bearer token and the cookie. A sign-in for an account without a password (an open invite) spends the same password check as an unknown name, in the pages and in POST /auth/login. Expired sessions are deleted a few at a time at sign-in and by the new command web-sessions prune.
Replaces "no web UI in v1" for administrators in the design document (sessions, sign-in, CSRF and origin, headers, statuses, cleanup) and adds the operator's guide to the admin pages (config, TLS proxy, upgrade, cleaning up).
Sign-ins through the web admin pages were recorded without a client kind, so an admin could not tell a browser session from anything else. Every audit event of the web sign-in path now carries `client_kind: "web"`: a sign-in with and without the second factor, a wrong password or a refused account, an unknown, expired, used or exhausted second-factor challenge, a wrong code, a recovery code used, and the lock set after too many wrong codes. A device can't claim the kind: CLIENT_KINDS, the list a sign-in or join may name, stays agent, desktop and cli, and only the web path sets Web. Failed sign-ins are aggregated per client kind as well, so device and web failures stay separate. Details stay JSON in the existing column; no migration.
The server (device sessions) shows a device's client_kind, platform and app_version in the device list, but the agent never sent them. Every sign-in and join of the agent now says it is an agent, which operating system it runs on and its own version, cut to the server's 32-byte limit. A server-backed test checks that the device list shows them after both.
Conflicts in apps/craft-cloud-agent/src/http.rs: join_over_with keeps the second factor fields and now also sends the device details. The first step of a two-factor sign-in (login_step_over) sends them too; the server keeps them in the challenge, so the second-factor request needs none.
This was referenced Nov 6, 2026
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Stacked on #22 (web admin pages): this branch contains #22's commits; this PR's own change is one commit, 39c682a (
git log --no-merges admin-ui-web..audit-web-kind); the merge commits after it bring in #14's update (the agent sends its device details). #22 listed "no web client kind" as an assumption; this closes it.Sign-ins through the web admin pages were recorded in the audit log with no device and no client kind, so an admin couldn't tell a browser session from anything else.
What
ClientKind::Web("web"). Every audit event of the web sign-in path now carriesclient_kind: "web":CLIENT_KINDS, the list a sign-in or join may name, staysagent,desktop,cli; only the web code setsWeb. A device sign-in or join that sends"web"is400 invalid, as for any unknown kind.weblike any other kind.Testing
cargo fmt --all -- --check,cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --locked -- -D warningscargo test -p craft-cloud-meta -p craft-cloud-server -p craft-cloud-api -p craft-cloud-proto --lockedon SQLite (732 tests)Postgres 17:
craft-cloud-metawithCRAFT_CLOUD_REQUIRE_BACKENDS=1;craft-cloud-server(the web route tests ran on SQLite and Postgres).Each rule was checked against a deliberately broken build, 12 in all. Examples:
"web"added to the device kinds;Each broken rule made its test fail.
Not tested