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Update dependency litellm to v1.84.0 [SECURITY] - #2142

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Update dependency litellm to v1.84.0 [SECURITY]#2142
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renovate-bot:renovate/pypi-litellm-vulnerability

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@renovate-bot renovate-bot commented Jul 30, 2026

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
litellm ==1.83.7==1.84.0 age confidence

Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.


LiteLLM has a sandbox escape in custom-code guardrail

CVE-2026-40217 / GHSA-wxxx-gvqv-xp7p

More information

Details

Impact

The POST /guardrails/test_custom_code endpoint runs user-supplied Python inside a hand-rolled sandbox. The sandbox can be escaped using bytecode-level techniques, allowing arbitrary code execution in the proxy process — which runs as root in the default Docker image.

Reaching the endpoint requires a proxy-admin credential in default configurations.

Patches

Fixed in 1.83.11. The hand-rolled sandbox has been replaced with RestrictedPython. Upgrade to 1.83.11 or later.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, block POST /guardrails/test_custom_code at your reverse proxy or API gateway.

References

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


LiteLLM: Authentication Bypass via Host Header Injection

CVE-2026-49468 / GHSA-4xpc-pv4p-pm3w

More information

Details

Impact

A Host-header parsing flaw in the LiteLLM proxy could, under specific conditions, allow unauthenticated access to protected management routes.

The auth layer derived the effective route from request.url.path in litellm/proxy/auth/auth_utils.py::get_request_route(), which Starlette reconstructs from the Host header. A crafted Host could therefore make the auth gate evaluate a different route from the one FastAPI dispatched.

Most deployments are not affected. The bypass is blocked by any upstream layer that validates or normalizes Host, such as:

  • a CDN or WAF, such as Cloudflare
  • a reverse proxy with server_name allowlists
  • a host-based load balancer

LiteLLM Cloud customers are not affected.

Patches

Fixed in 1.84.0. Upgrade to 1.84.0 or later. No configuration change is required.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, place the proxy behind an upstream component that validates or normalizes the Host header before forwarding (a CDN/WAF, a reverse proxy with explicit server_name allowlists, or a cloud load balancer with host-based routing rules), or otherwise restrict network access to the proxy listener.

References

Discovery Credit: Le The Thang (KCSC) and Kim Ngoc Chung (One Mount Group)

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 9.5 / 10 (Critical)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Release Notes

BerriAI/litellm (litellm)

v1.84.0

⚠️ Heads up — this release contains breaking changes.
Read the full release notes here: v1.84.0 release notes


Verify Docker Image Signature

All LiteLLM Docker images are signed with cosign. Every release is signed with the same key introduced in commit 0112e53.

Verify using the pinned commit hash (recommended):

A commit hash is cryptographically immutable, so this is the strongest way to ensure you are using the original signing key:

cosign verify \
  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/0112e53046018d726492c814b3644b7d376029d0/cosign.pub \
  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.84.0

Verify using the release tag (convenience):

Tags are protected in this repository and resolve to the same key. This option is easier to read but relies on tag protection rules:

cosign verify \
  --key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/v1.84.0/cosign.pub \
  ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:v1.84.0

Expected output:

The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
  - The cosign claims were validated
  - The signatures were verified against the specified public key

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: BerriAI/litellm@v1.83.14-stable.patch.3...v1.84.0


Configuration

📅 Schedule: (UTC)

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🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@forking-renovate forking-renovate Bot added lang: python Issues specific to Python. type:security labels Jul 30, 2026
@renovate-bot
renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-litellm-vulnerability branch from a86dbbc to 36a1e4b Compare August 11, 2026 00:36
@renovate-bot renovate-bot changed the title Update dependency litellm to v1.83.10 [SECURITY] Update dependency litellm to v1.84.0 [SECURITY] Aug 11, 2026
@renovate-bot
renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-litellm-vulnerability branch from 36a1e4b to 0ff5351 Compare August 12, 2026 19:54
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