Flare opens files from other people (.flare, .fla/XFL, SWF, images, sounds, fonts) and can be driven by an AI agent over MCP, so we treat every input as untrusted.

Only the latest release and main receive fixes.

Do not open a public issue. Report privately through GitHub: https://github.com/Flare-Animate/Flare/security/advisories/new

If you cannot use GitHub, ask a developer for a private channel on Discord without describing the problem in public.

Please include the file or input that triggers it, the version or commit, your platform, and what you saw (crash, hang, memory growth, file written outside where it should be, and so on). A small reproducer is the most useful thing you can send.

You can expect an acknowledgement within a week. We will tell you when a fix is released and credit you unless you prefer not to be named.

• A crash, hang or unbounded memory/disk use caused by a crafted file or MCP/CLI input.
• Writing, overwriting or reading a file the user did not choose (path traversal in archives, exports, MCP tool arguments).
• Anything that runs code from a document. Flare does not run ActionScript; it is kept as data.
• Memory-unsafety. The workspace is safe Rust; unsafe is not used in our crates.

Not security issues: a file Flare does not import faithfully (open a normal issue) or a bug that needs the attacker to already control your machine.

The rules are in AGENTS.md and docs/ENGINEERING.md:

• All input is untrusted and everything that grows has a bound (file sizes, archive entries, frame counts, image sizes, preferences, recent lists, history).
• No unwrap, expect or panics on user data; errors are typed.
• Exports and publishes write beside the target and rename into place, never overwrite, and leave nothing behind on failure.
• The MCP server only writes inside an export directory chosen at start-up, accepts plain file names only, and caps image sizes.
• Property tests feed random and truncated data to the importers, storage and the editing core; see docs/TESTING.md.

CI runs cargo audit on Cargo.lock for every push. At the time of 0.1.0 it reports no vulnerabilities. It does warn that a few indirect dependencies are unmaintained or carry an unsoundness advisory: ttf-parser (through the window-decoration font code), proc-macro-error, the zbus family (through the file dialogs), and glib (through the menu library's GTK support, which only exists in its Linux build; Flare uses that library on macOS only, so glib is in Cargo.lock but not in any shipped program). They are tracked and will be replaced when their parents move.