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It covers one specific thing, and it is worth being exact about where it stops.
What is proven: nine invariants over the kernel decision function. They are compiled from the Cedar model with cedar-policy-symcc and discharged by the cvc5 SMT solver over the whole input space the schema admits — not sampled, not fuzzed. Each one ships with a negative control: remove the guard and the proof must refute, so a proof that passes vacuously is caught.
What is not proven: the HTTP server, the ledger, the storage layer, the SDKs. Those are ordinary Rust covered by ordinary tests.
There is also a deliberate seam inside the proofs. Two invariants — attenuation-edge and revocation-gate — reason over attributes such as principal.ancestors that the kernel derives from the delegation chain before the solver runs. cvc5 sees them as flat values. So those two prove that if the derived attributes are right, the policy enforces attenuation and revocation; the derivation itself is trusted base, covered by re-derivation tests against hand-written ground truth plus property tests over random forests and cycles. The invariant statements say so in the source rather than leaving you to work it out.
scope-gate is likewise bounded to {Read, MoveMoney, AccessPII}. An operator who adds an action is outside that invariant until it gets a scope-name convention and a guard entry — again stated rather than implied, because an unbounded version would refute against any extended schema.
Short version: the decision function is machine-checked over every input the schema allows. The system around it is not, and decern tries never to let the word "proven" carry more than that.
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It covers one specific thing, and it is worth being exact about where it stops.
What is proven: nine invariants over the kernel decision function. They are compiled from the Cedar model with
cedar-policy-symccand discharged by the cvc5 SMT solver over the whole input space the schema admits — not sampled, not fuzzed. Each one ships with a negative control: remove the guard and the proof must refute, so a proof that passes vacuously is caught.What is not proven: the HTTP server, the ledger, the storage layer, the SDKs. Those are ordinary Rust covered by ordinary tests.
There is also a deliberate seam inside the proofs. Two invariants —
attenuation-edgeandrevocation-gate— reason over attributes such asprincipal.ancestorsthat the kernel derives from the delegation chain before the solver runs. cvc5 sees them as flat values. So those two prove that if the derived attributes are right, the policy enforces attenuation and revocation; the derivation itself is trusted base, covered by re-derivation tests against hand-written ground truth plus property tests over random forests and cycles. The invariant statements say so in the source rather than leaving you to work it out.scope-gateis likewise bounded to{Read, MoveMoney, AccessPII}. An operator who adds an action is outside that invariant until it gets a scope-name convention and a guard entry — again stated rather than implied, because an unbounded version would refute against any extended schema.Short version: the decision function is machine-checked over every input the schema allows. The system around it is not, and decern tries never to let the word "proven" carry more than that.
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